HISTORY OF TIMOR 3 (On the island of Santa Cruz)

3. On the Island of Santa Cruz

As described in chapter 2, down until the early seventeenth Century, it was Solor and Flores, not Timor, that was the focus of Portuguese and Dutch Commercial activities in the eastern archipelago. Timor, including the ports of Lifau, Kupang, Bahao, in the bay of Kupang, and Dili, was visited periodically by the Portuguese during the Solor period, but there was no permanent Portuguese establishment on the island and no population on the island under Portuguese authority. The Dominican mission, however, was more adventurous in this sense. It remains to be studied as to how and why the island of Timer, dubbed Santa Cruz by the early missions, came to emerge by the end of the seventeenth century at centre-stage of intra-colonial rivalry in the archipelago? It also remains to determine whether, as in the Solor phase, Portugal in its conquest of Timor was also obliged to accommodate to local and regional power networks a much overarching Chinese trade networks that made the venture commercially viable? World Incorporation or Asian Tributary Power? The phenomenon of European expansion, of which Timor seems to exemplify, has drawn heated debate between two broad schools of world history. This has been summarized by Frank and Gills, as turning upon 500 years of history or a 5,000 years perspective. The 5,000 year perspective allows for a seamless view of history stretching back to antiquity, acknowledging, that the "new world" was in fact home to a world-systems prior to its incorporation from 1492. By contrast, Wallerstein and others regard capital accumulation over the past 500 years as the motor force of world-system theory and continuous capital accumulation as the differentia specifica of the modern world-system. In the latter view, world empires or tributary systems were dominated by ideological questions as opposed to the economic law of value in the accumulation of capital. For Frank, the debate is really about continuity versus discontinuity in world history. 1

For Wallerstein, the East Indies remained external to the European system between 1500 and 1800. The Portuguese did not break the international Asian character of trade and only conducted trade on terms established by the Asian nations. In making this claim Wallerstein also finds support in arguments of the prewar Dutch scholar and opponent of Eurocentric historiography, J.C. van Leur. Asia, in / the Wallersteinean view therefore remained an external arena in a relationship between two zones "not within a single division of labour" involving the trade in luxury goods versus trade in bulk or necessities. According to Wallerstein, luxury exports refers to the disposition of socially low-value items at prices far higher than those obtainable for their alternate usages. Such traffic then is only applicable between two separate historical systems holding different measures of social values.2

Such obviously was the case of prized nutmeg and Cloves from the Moluccas which entered trade chains reaching to Europe, but this was also the case of sandalwood From Timor which entered the "external arena" in India and China via Java or Malacca as a product of luxury consumption in religious ceremonies. The Wallersteinean view that the East Indies remained outside the European system up until around 1750, and that the Portuguese and Dutch relations with the Asian states was essentially conducted on Asian terms has been challenged by Victor Lieberman. But while van Leur was correct to signal the maritime outpost character of the trade, Lieberman asserts that even in line with Wallerstein's other criteria, archipelagic Southeast Asia was already on the way to peripheralization by 1650 or 1700. Not to burden this discussion with more facts and theory, Lieberman offers the example of the Manila galleon trade which "deadened" Spanish interest in developing a native economy. Throughout the archipelago, he offers, the VOC succeeded through "brutal assaults and sustained naval attacks" where the Portuguese failed in winning monopolies. But the "historic achievement of the Portuguese", he continues, was to accelerate the political and commercial fragmentation of the western archipelago disrupting and destroying, particularly the integrative thrust of the Malacca Sultanate. The only exception to the rule that local economies were actually contracting, he offers, is the case of Aceh 3

In this discussion we should not also ignore certain of the assumptions of the school of general crisis of the seventeenth century, given early voice in Voltaire's pioneering global history, Essai, that uprisings across Europe found their match in India, China and Japan. While there is more than a little coincidence in these events, we cannot ignore the impact even in the Timor-Solor-Flores zone of the consequences of such climactic European events as the Dutch revolt against Spain, the Spanish conquest of Portugal in 1580, the running war by the Dutch against the Iberian powers in South America and the Far East, Portugal's official renewal of war with the Dutch in 1621 and the Portuguese overthrow of Spanish rule in 1640-68.4

But to offer a totally European-determinate view of events of this period would be to seriously

underestimate the strength of what Japanese scholar Hamashita has called the "tribute trade system". Asian history writ large, he sees as "the history of a unified system characterised by internal tribute or tribute-trad relations, with China at the centre". He sees this regional conception of history as the premise of an understanding of modern Asia.5

While, to be sure, we cannot ignore China's and Japan's variable responses to the new Euro-centric trading patterns, at the same time, we should not ignore the new rising maritime centres of power, namely Islamic Macassar and other centres. While for Frank and Gills, the general distinction between the 500 years and 5,000 years debate concerns continuities, the question which concerns us here is whether Portugal ruptured or accommodated existing Asian maritime trading networks in the eastern archipelago?

Mena and the Conquest of Wehale (1589-164)

Although the record on the first Church contacts with Timor remains obscure, even alongside that of Solor, it appears likely that the first port of arrival in Timor to receive the solicitations of the Dominicans was Mena near Atapupu in west Timor. Manuel Teixeira writes that in 1589-90 one Fr. Belchior da Luz or de Antas disembarked in the port of Mena, was well received by the local raja, and constructed a church. But after six months' evangelization he decided to withdraw.

According to this account, while the polygamous raja did not convert, he nevertheless offered up his daughter to the faith and she accompanied Belchior back to Malacca where she was baptized.6

While the facts surrounding the first mission in Timor remain unclear, the early nineteenth century French traveller, de Freycinet, who made a rigorous study of extant Dutch and Portuguese printed materials, places this at 1616 when, obliged to nee their fortresses on Solor and Flores, certain missionaries arrived at Setern on Timor and commenced evangelization. According to this account, a more concerted effort was made in 1630 with the arrival in Timor from Larantuca of members of the Dominican order who, inter alia, baptized the raja of Silaban, a kingdom located between Atapupu and Batugede.7

Even so, as shown below, it would be 50 years before the Order of the Preachers ventured back to Mena. It was no coincidence, then, that Mena was attested by Garcia da Orta in 1563, and Cristovao da Costa in 1578, as the source of the best sandal on Timor.8

While the Portuguese were content with their foothold on Solor as local collecting point for trade goods from Timor, up until 1613, they also occupied a small fort on Kupang in west Timor. In that year, as mentioned, the fort was surrendered to the Dutch who garrisoned it with a force of 50 men. According to de Freycinet, fresh from victory over the Portuguese at Solor (20 April 1613), Apollonius Schotte proceeded to Mena, then the seat of one of the more powerful kingdoms at least in terms of its control over the export of sandal. Moving on to explore the bay of Kupang, Schotte, agent of the venerable Dutch East India Company, also entered into various treaties with local rulers and, by Consent or duress, obtained permission to establish fortresses at Mena and at Kupang. To this end, he left behind a number of men at both places prior to his departure.9

All Dutch Claims to Timor date from these treaties.10 Thus with the occupation of the Kupang and Mena forts, the Dutch took up a permanent presence on Timor, even though they temporarily abandoned their position on Timor and Flores in 1616. Schotte's own account offers certain elaboration. During the siege of Solor prior to his own arrival on Timor, he dispatched to Timor on 7 February the Half Moon under the command of William Jansz along with a Captured Portuguese galiota. On Timor this expedition captured a Portuguese naveta, its cargo of 250 "bares" of sandal, along with 13

Portuguese, "blacks" and mestico. Another Portuguese galliot was looted of its sandal and destroyed, its crew left to the mercy of the natives. Schotte describes how, after seeing off the largest group of Portuguese on Solor for Larantuca and Malacca he embarked for Timor on the Patane, recently arrived from Amboina, accompanied by the Half Moon and the galliot, for the specific purpose of drawing up treaties with kings of the interior. Landing on Timor on 4 June 1613 he requested an audience with the king of Mena and the king of Asson seeking to forge an

alliance on the model of that already accomplished with the kings of Temate, Buton and Solor. Both, he declared, were the strongest kings on Timor, pagan, albeit more credible than the Moors. Both promised to deliver sandal. Mena offered to load the Half Moon with sandal, while Schotte offered to build a fort for Mena. In these successful negotiations Schotte was assisted by several interpreters including Jean G. de Vrye. He also offered certain trade goods as presents. Although two of his agents, William Jocobiz and Melis Andriez had earlier made contact with the king of Amanubang, said to command much trade in sandal, Schotte was at a loss for time to actually conclude any treaty. Schotte also received envoys of the king of Kupang who offered to convert to Christianity along with all his subjects, "as he also promised the Portuguese, before our arrival". But in dealing with Kupang, Schotte gained valuable intelligence from a captured letter written by Father Vicario, a Dominican on Solor, which waxed eloquent over the advantages offered by Kupang for commerce on the Coast of Timor, "a Portuguese design we should follow", and which also remarked upon the general hostility of the natives which, Schotte Calculated, could be turned to the advantage of the Dutch.11

In 1627, as mentioned, the function of Governor of Solor was taken over by the Dutch protege, Jan d 'Hornay. Turned renegade and siding with the Portuguese, the d'Hornay clan, as explained below, later emerged as the de facto sovereign power with their base on Larantuca. This state of affairs lingered on, at least until l640, when Portugal made a temporary comeback in Asia as a result of separation of the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns. But, in this same year, Macassar rose in revolt against the considerable Portuguese presence in that port and later mounted an invasion of Larantuca, then under the Captain-Major Francisco Fernandez. At this time Macassar traders were involved in the sandalwood, wax and slave trade in the islands and may even have established several trading villages on Timor. Dominican sources state tha the Muslim raja (Sultan) of Tolo on Celebes, Karrilikio (Camiliquio), then advanced upon Timor attacking both the north and south coast with a meet of 150 prauh or sailing vessels along with 7,000 men where he sought, without success, to turn the natives against the Portuguese. After three months of ravages along the coastal littoral of Timor and some success at winning Muslim converts or at least the notional loyalty of tw rajas on Timor, Karrilikio retreated. His endeavours, however, gave stimulus to the Portuguese mission in Larantuca to transfer their activities t Timor. 12

In the venture, Antonio de Sao Jacinto, the Dominican friar and Vicar-General of Solor, accompanied by 70 soldiers, departed Larantuca for Mena which he found destroyed and the raja dead. In the interim, the deceased raja's wife had taken over as queen but on account of the Muslim invasion, fled to the interior some 12 leagues distant. Having made contact with the queen, the Dominican father won over her confidence and, back in Mena in 1641, accepted her conversion. Her people followed suit. At this time the kingdom of Lifau was governed by a brother-in-law of the queen, Amanubang, a future thorn in the side of the Dutch. He, too, requested conversion and, before too long, several churches were constructed, both on the coast and in the interior. Meanwhile, the Dominicans tuned their attentions towards the western part of

the island. In this endeavour, the Flores-based missionary, Luiz de Paixao, was assassinated at Kupang. The following year, Antonio de Sao Domingo baptized the king of Kupang and numerous of his people. The Portuguese then referred to Timor as the island of Santa-Cruz, a name which endured over long time. 13

According to de Freycinet owing to the contestation brought about by a number of kingdoms, otherwise influenced by Karrilikio's brand of Islam-although this seems dubious-He Portuguese were moved to advance reinforcements from Larantuca to Mena. Led by Francisco Fernandez, this manoeuvre took the form of four landings of two bodies of men made on 26 May 1641 comprising, in all, some 90 soldiers and clerics. In what might be regarded as the first act of armed conquest on Timor, this force engaged in Comba an army of the raja of Wehale at a river on the perimeter of the kingdom of Mena. Victory in 1642 over Wehale also brought with it the conversion of a number of local rajas and their followers. 14

According to a contemporary account, "The news of the destruction of the mighty potentate of Belos spread rapidly through the other kingdoms in the neighbourhood". Wehale's defeat, as historian Jill Jolliffe remarks, "marked the beginning of a concerted attack on Timorese society" leading many liurai, little kings or holders of unlimited land to become baptized.15

For Abilio de Araujo, less sanguine as to the receptivity of the natives of Timor to their evangelization and erstwhile incorporation, the assault on Wehale represented the opening shots of an almost uninterrupted wa of resistance by the Timorese against Portuguese power. 16

There is no question, then, that the evangelization of Father Antonio de Sao Jacinto marks the definitive establishment of the church on Timor. But, as the reinos embraced the faith, they also swore loyalty to the Crown of Portugal confirmed by the obligation to pay up to the head of the Dominican mission certain items of tribute along with manpower in the case of threats by rivals outside the fold. Indeed, the historical personality of Antonio Sao Jacinto, as much the link between the Crown and commercial advantage, is confirmed by the existence in Portuguese archives of a carta or letter sent by the missionary to King Joao IV concerning the foundation of Christianity on Timor along with the purported discovery on the island of "great copper mines". So frequent in fact are exaggerated references to Timor's mythical copper and even gold resources in Dominican writings that there is reason to believe that the religious order played this card in the full knowledge that the disastrous loss of the Japan trade would lead to a compensating interest by th Estado da India in the Solor-Flores-Timor zone.17

Writing in 992, the Timorese scholar Father Francisco Fernandes has described how the system of winning rei cristao or vassals was multiplied outside the Lifau region to embrace, by 1644, the reinos of Kupang, Acao, and Luca, on the southeast coast. In 1647, a Vicar-General of the church was appointed in Timor, although it was not until 1697 that the first Dominican Bishop, D. Frei Manuel de Santo Antonio, actually took up his office in Timor. While in Timor, as in Solor, the Dominicans exercised both spiritual and temporal power, with the successful arrival of the first Governor in 1702, the Dominicans were freed from affairs of state, devoting themselves to missionary activity, founding a seminary in Oecusse in 1738 with another established some years later in Manatuto east of Dili.18

While the early history of the church in Timor is dominated by the Order of the Preachers, it was not for want of trying that their rival order, the Jesuits, did not carry their mission to Timor. In fact, an attempt mad in 1658 by two Jesuit missionaries, Joao Nogueira and Pero Francisco, to preach the gospel in Luca-then receptive to Christianity-Came undone, at the hands of the King of Ade into whose kingdom on the northeast tip of Timor they had strayed. The leader of a second expedition did achieve success in baptizing a number of children in the Kingdom of Motael, where he found installed a company of Christian soldiers relocated from Larantuca for the purpose of defending Motael against Muslim incursions. 19

A little over a decade later, interdenominational rivalry took a turn for the worse. Fearful of a Jesuit takeover in the person of Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, the celebrated Macassar-based Portuguese trader, the Larantuca Dominicans had him murdered in December 1667. As one Church document records, more than one ruler on Flores and Timor (Amarasi wished to have Fathers with "black robes and with a round hat", an allusion to Jesuit garb. Some saw Vieira as their saviour. But others rose in opposition against him. Jesuit documents hint at foul play by jealous Dominicans who, having lived there for 100 years "refuse to lean the native language to [the] great detriment of people's salvation. They do not prevent Muslim preachers from Islamizing the heathens, but they would expel other missionaries. They are steadily occupied in building ships for their commerce and in making profit, leaving the souls uncared for". 20 But, even as the missions feuded with each other, church-state relations in Lifau continued to be uneasy. Frei Manuel de Antonio, for instance, found himself expelled from Lifau in 1722 by Governor Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho.

Kupang (1642-99)

Drawing on Fran?oise Valentijn's account, de Freycinet explains how, after the Dutch seizure of Malacca in 1642, Portugal's Protestant rival took a more assertive position in the eastern archipelago. Notable, in this respect, was the abortive attack launched in 1644 on Kupang also known as Cuppao, where the Portuguese, or, at least, the Dominican Father Antonio de Sao Jacinto, whose resourcefulness in winning converts in Mena and Kupang has already been noted, constructed a rudimentary fortress two years earlier. Later in the same year the Dutch returned with a force of 300 along with a motley force of foreign mercenaries but again were unable to take Kupang. Only in 1646 were they successful in their takeover of the Solor fort on 27 January 1656 the Dutch returned under General Arnold de Vlamingh van Outshoorn who forced a landing in the bay of Kupang at the head of an "imposing" force of European and Indian troops. Vlamingh then advanced on the village of Amarasi to engage the Portuguese and their allies, namely those under Antonio d'Hornay. In the ensuing battle, Vlamingh suffered the loss of 170 European soldiers and was obliged to retreat to his base in Solor.21

Four years earlier, in 1652; the Dutch had accomplished their main objective in ousting the Dominican friar from Kupang, seizing their unfinished buildings, and converting them in a stronghold. Even so, the Friars managed to keep the Dutch at bay by calling upon the "Black Portuguese", another name for the Larantuqueiros, or mixed blood Portuguese-native Community which had emerged in Larantuca and Solor.22

In 1660 the Dutch mounted an unsuccessful attempt by a 26-ship squadron to destroy Larantuca, deemed the major arsenal for the Portuguese in the east. It was in response to this harrowing situation that the Viceroy of Goa, Antonio de Melo e Castro, resolved in 1665 to create the post of Capitao-mor of Timor to coordinate the struggle against the Dutch. The first to hold this position was Simon Luis. But determined that Kupang would be the major Dutch trading post in the eastern islands, Batavia finally got its way in 1688 when the Dutch took Control of the town and several neighbouring kingdoms.23

Renamed Fort Concordia, Kupang became the major Dutch base and stronghold in the Lesser Sundas over long time. Dampier, who visited Kupang in 1699, observed a "neat little church or chapel" within the walls of the fort He also found a garrison of about 50 soldiers, a similar number of native troops, along with well-supplied vegetable gardens. He also observed that the Dutch reserved two sloops for the purpose of inter-island trade and commerce with the Coastal peoples of Timor. In an interesting aside, he commented that, unlike then Portuguese, the Dutch in Kupang invariably mastered Malay language as a lingua franca in the business of Commerce.24

Lifau in Oecusse

Eventually, 50 years of destructive conflict between the two European powers was brought to an end by mediation. Under the Treaty of Peace, signed between Portugal and Holland on 6 August 1661 at The Hague, it was determined that each power would reserve to itself the territories already occupied on Solor and Timor. The Dutch kept Kupang but-Was observed by Dampier- were also obliged to furnish two armed sloops for the service of the Portuguese governor, one to transport the taxes collected in Timor, the other to defend the coast against the ldepre4ations of Macassar. 25

While Lifau (variously Lifau, Liphao, Leiffauw) in Oecusse on the northwest coast of Timor gradually emerged as a favourite port of call for the Portuguese, especially sandalwood traders from Macau, by the 1650s they still had no permanent settlement on the island. As was the practice in Macau prior to gaining a permanent presence in 1 557, the Portuguese traders arriving in Timer would build temporary dwellings in which to live for some weeks or months while waiting to conclude business or awaiting the change of season. One of the strongest voices calling for the direct conquest of Timor was the Macau-based trader, Pascoal Barreto. His petition to King Joao IV from Macau in December 1645 makes interesting reading. Whether accurate o not Barreto was convinced from commercial intelligence received in Macassar that Timor was rich in, besides timber, gold and a particularly high grade of Copper. Observing that, with the decline of the Japan trade, Macau was bereft of this last commodity otherwise used in the manufacture of cannon, and that, notwithstanding the various attempts by Macassar, Timor neither paid tribute nor had it been conquered by any nation. Although Barreto himself was poised to sail to Timor from Macassar in the same year, he detoured to Manila instead upon learning of the restoration of the monarchy.26

While the Treaty of Peace of 166l offered a respite and opportunity to the Portuguese in the Far East, it would be 40 odd years before decisive action was taken. A carta or letter sent by the Senate in Macau to the Spanish Governor in Manila on 12 April 1692 argued strongly as to the necessity of establishing both government structures and a mission on Timor.27

Accordingly, at regular intervals, I beginning as early as 1695, the Viceroy of Goa attempted to appoint a Portuguese official as Governor at Lifau. At least until the opening years of the following century, as discussed below, a group of Christianized mestico rulers and their local allies saw to it that each successive appointee was expelled, besieged, or overthrown. 28

Thus the first Governor to set foot on Timor, Antonio de Mesquita Pimentel, was expelled in 1697 by Domingos da Costa scion of the powerful clan of that name, while his successor, Andr6 Coelho Vieira, was arrested by the same person in Larantuca and sent back to Macau. By 1697 Lifau was evidently well enough established, although hardly well defended, to attract the unwanted attentions of a French pirate vessel. Fresh from seizing the Dutch fort at Kupang and burning the tow, this pirate then proceeded to pillage Lifau for what it was worth. 29

When, in 1699, William Dampier visited Lifau in the course of his three-month sojoum on Timer, he found that a settlement, a community and basic governmental structures had been firmly established. After Kupang, under Dutch control, Lifau emerged as the second most important trading port on the island. While, in Dampier's estimation, Lifau could not hold out against 100 men, and while powder and bullets were scarce and dear, the settlement was, nevertheless, deemed capable of mustering 600 men in 24 hours "all armed with Hand-Guns, Swords and Pistols". But, he continued, "They have no Fort, nor Magazine of Arms: nor does the Vice-Roy of Goa send them any now."

Dampier found in Lifau but three Portuguese, two of whom were priests, the balance of the population made up of Portuguese mestico and a few resident Chinese trading wax, gold, slaves and sandalwood against rice and porcelain and certain European commodities imported each year on a meet of about 20 vessels from Macau. As Dampier well understood, the trading season was limited from late March to late August, but with the arrival of the monsoon, Lifau no longer offered a safe anchorage. Characteristically, boats from Macau would leave towards the end of the year sailing direct to Batavia before making the journey east through the archipelago to Timor arriving early the following year. The return journey assisted with the southwest monsoon was also via Batavia. On government, Dampier observed, the real authority lay with the Captain-Major, a man named Antonio Henriquez, a Portuguese sent by the Viceroy in Goa.

Despite his title this person was deeply involved in forging military alliances with natives against their adversaries. At the time of Dampier's visit, Henriquez was actually resident in a place described as Porta Nova on the "eastern end of the island", a reference to Larantuca On Flores. The second-in-command, one Alexis Mendoza, a mestico, Dampier referred to as a "Mongrel-Breed of Indians and Portugueze" as were the next most subordinate authorities. He continued, "For though they pretend to be under the King of Portugal, they are assort of lawless People, and are under no Government". 30

Neither, Dampier observed, had Goa reciprocated by sending a supply ship. This reference to Goa is not without interest as the Estado da India was ostensibly responsible for keeping up contact with the islands by sending an armed frigate with supplies to Larantuca or Lifau. But, by the eighteenth century, only one or two voyages from Goa actually touched Timor. Thereafter, Governors, Captains-Majors, soldiers and supplies invariably arrived in Timor via Macau.31

While, as seen, in the last decades of the seventeenth century Lifau came to be established under an ad hoe system of military and religious rule, as of 20 February 1702, the settlement came under tighter control as seat of the Portuguese government ton Timor. The first to hold this office in Lifau was Antonio Coelho Guerreiro (1702-05), going by the title of Governor and Captain General of the islands of Timor and Solor and other regions in the South. As a Crown-appointed office, it follows that the documentation on Timor, o at least that surrounding his appointment, also expanded apace. Notably, Governor Guerreiro bequeathed the first map of Lifau, the Planta da Praia de Lifau. Dated 1702, it reveals a fairly complex urban structure supporting military, civil and ecclesiastical elements, including the Ermida de St. Antonio along with a hospital.

Boxer, who has traced Guerreiro's Career, offers that his was an important appointment, especially given hi background as Colonial Secretary of Angola and later as Secretary of State in Goa. Even so, when Guerreiro arrived in Macau from Goa in June of 1701 to take up his appointment, he was not given a specific brief, besides neutralizing Dutch and Chinese control over sandalwood and taking a firm stand against the rebellion of the da Costas. He sailed from Macau in January 1702 with less than 100 soldiers to enforce his authority. He also came equipped with military and other equipment for the rundown settlement and Fortaleza at Lifau.

His cargo also included 200 piculs of rice necessary to tide over the settlement from certain starvation. In any case, Guerreiro sought and gained a short-lived alliance between the Crown and Portuguese country traders in the form of two of Macau's ships and manpower for military operations in Timor, which also included unauthorized conflict with the Dutch. 32

While Governor Guerreiro evidently succeeded in imposing order upon the rebellious mestico population o Lifau and in raising the prestige of the Crown, it is also true that he was closely besieged in Lifau for nearly three years by a rebellious chieftain of the da Costa family, an allusion to the rising power of the mestico, a discussed in a following chapter. Guerreiro also took it in hand to equalize the power of the friendly chiefs, some of whom claimed sovereignty over others, by conferring the rank of dato, a traditional title, or colone where appropriate, on tribal heads and nobles, a practice, according to Boxer, which continued down to modern times. Even though Governor Guerreiro sent glowing reports to Goa on Timor's riches he finally abandoned the struggle and left Lifau in "disgust and disguise" at the end of 1704. This is known from the reference to a certain "Portuguese gentleman" who shipped out of Lifau with the English sea captain Alexander Hamilton bound from Batavia to Goa, as mentioned in his A New Account of the East Indies. 33

Church documents reveal not only that certain governors fled or were expelled from Lifau, but that great tension beset church and crow. Looking back upon his experience at Lifau, Fr. Manuel de Santo Antonio mote, he had "not a moment of peace in Timor", an allusion to tension between himself (or successors) with a succession of Governors, beginning with Antonio Coelho Guerreiro (1702-05), Jacome de Morais Sarmento (1708-09), Manuel de Sotto Mayor (1709-13), Manuel Fereira de Almeida [not mentioned on official lists of Governors, but a possible rival to Domingos da Costa (1713-18)], Francisco de Mello de Castro (1718-20) and Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho (1722- 1725). According to an account published in the official bulletin in Goa, church papers reveal many accusations and recriminations. Certain of these quarrels involved clashes of personality, namely that between the Bishop and Mello de Castro several days after they arrived in Lifau together by ship from Goa, or matters of substance between Church authorities, such as in 1708 when the Bishop requested the dispatch of missionaries of orders other than the Dominicans. In the event, a memo written in the Limos das Moncoes States that such problems between civil and ecclesiastical authorities meant little time for the Bishop to devote himself to spiritual matters ove the outlying regions of Timor. In a word, "A hist6ria de Timor naquella epocha he um tecido de desordem e de anarchia". 34

Generously, Boxer offers that, by this stage, Lifau had "assumed the kind of status of Alsatia, largely populated by cutthroats", a reference to the slave traders and slave raiders, and French and German deserters from the Dutch army, among other roughnecks, who assembled in the place. Neither, from all accounts, did the Dominican mission raise the moral tone of the desolate outpost. Yet, he continues, while Lifau never seems to have progressed far beyond its pioneer beginnings, it nevertheless constituted the centre of Portuguese power in the island and its establishment marked the transfer of Portuguese power from Flores to Timor, 35

Ushering in some 250 years of actual Portuguese presence on the island. 36

Macau, the Chinese, and the Sandalwood Trade

As one student of Timor's sandalwood trade has written, by the second half of the I sixteenth century, Malacca was overtaken as the preferred sailing route to Timor/Solor by Macassar on Celebes. Malacca, embroiled in war with Aceh and Johore, lost its attractiveness as a commercial centre. Macassar, meanwhile, grew to the second in size and rank to Macau within the Portuguese east, especially after the loss of the Japan trade.37

While we have Commented upon the rupture between the Portuguese and Tolo over the latter's expedition against Timor in 1641, eventually in 1648 the Estado da India ordered leading Portuguese trader Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo to reach a new modus vivendi with Tolo that would preserve he Portuguese trading position in Macassar while reserving the Solor-Flores-Timor zone to Portugal and its allies. Eventually Portuguese trade at Ma6assar with Manila, India and Timor became the mainstay for the city of Macau in the period between the 1640s and 1660s, but with the Macassar Dutch treaty of 1660 and the Dutch Conquest of Macassar in 1667, the Portuguese once again lost an important ally, market and emporium in the archipelago.38

Necessarily, both Chinese and Portuguese merchants adapted to the new circum stances. Certainly, the Chinese were well apprised of the importance of Solor in this trade along with all the superior anchorages on the coast of Timor. To the extent that the Chinese engaged in the trade in the decades following the opening of Solor, the Portuguese definitely sought to keep them out. Also, as discussed in a following chapter, the rise of power by the creolized group and the abandonment by the Portuguese of Lifau in favour of Dili facilitated Chinese control of the commodity shipped out of Kupang or Atapupu under only nominal supervision. The role of Chinese, including Macau Chinese, alongside Portuguese in the sandalwood trade with Timor

goes back to the Malacca period and only ended when that city succumbed to the long Dutch blockade and eventual siege. According to de Matos, by the end of the sixteenth century, the Malacca-Timor voyages were auctioned out for the princely sum of 500 cruzados.39

Ptak believes that while the ratio of Chinese shipments to Portuguese remains unclear, the Portuguese share began to increase after 1600. A letter by the Bishop of Cochin, F. Pedro da Silva, dated 1609, suggests that, while the ordinary price for sandal in Macau was 20 patacas a

picul, during years when little shipping arrived from Timor ,[via Malacca] the price soured to 150 patacas. Profits increased over the years. According to the estimate of Bishop Rangel in 1630, profits on the trade ran at 150 to 200 percent, aptly earning Timor the reputation of "Ilha do sandalo". 40

It is only in 1634 that we first find mention in the Limos das Moncoes do Reino of direct sailings from Macau to Macassar and Solor. Timorese and Solorese sail ors may have joined the crew of Portuguese ship at this time. Among the martyrs of the ill-fated Portuguese Embassy sent to Nagasaki in 1640 were Alberto a 16 years old Timorese deck hand and slave and Antonio, a 40 year-old slave from Solor, both "owned" by Macau-based members of the Portuguese crew. But just as the crew of the Japan boat were drawn from a mixed Company of Portuguese, Spanish, Arabs, Chinese, Indians, and Africans along with peoples from the Philippines and Indonesian islands, so it is fair to assume that the India and Macau boat arriving in Timor brought to these shores several times a year peoples of variety of races and religions. 41

According to de Matos, until 1638 the sandal trade was carried out by the Royal treasury in Macau, and, until 689 the voyages were carried out by private persons or the Capitao-mor on a voyage assigned for three years. While the trade was not necessarily the monopoly of individuals, it was the monopoly of Macau for the citizens of Macau and at the expense of the Chinese of Canton who traded sandal from Timor with Batavia. It was thus a great loss to the Macau treasury that native rulers carried the trade to Babao where it entered the Dutch trade.42

The significance of the Timor-Macau trade is confirmed by other sources, notably, a Dutch work of l646 states that 1,000 bahar of sandal was taken to Macau annually. But overall, writes Ptak, the Macau-Timor trade was "favoured by the relative lightness of taxes and dues" and not placed on a strict monopoly basis like the voyages to Japan or the quasi-monopoly status of the Malacca voyages through which the earlier Timor trade had been mediated. 43

From Macau archival sources we know that in 1689 numerous terms of assent were drawn up by the Macau Senate for Chinese merchants to send ships direct to Batavia, or for the Timor and Solor voyage. In that year five pautas or sealed lists were offered by Macau, albeit mandated by the Viceroy of Goa. These were literally vermilion seals embossed in the arms and crown of Portugal. Pedro Vaz de Siqueira was one such individual awarded the Timor voyage in that year for his ship Rozario, that would also be used on future occasions (1698) to transport soldiers to Lifau. In 1693 the Convent of S. Francisco also won a pauta do navio, suggesting a church interest in the trade. The following year the Senate discussed conditions of employment of Malays on the Timor voyages, a possible suggestion that Timorese who had achieved a non-slave or free status also visited the Chinese city, albeit a status that required regulation. 44

Whereas from 1678 to 1689, the Timor voyages were organized either by the Captain-major of Macau or by private individuals on a three year basis, on 20 October 1689, the Senate of Macau passed the following resolution on the sandalwood trade with Timor with specific reference to estimates made by the pilots and Supercargoes: ...each of these ships can load 1,800 piculs of sandalwood cargo, above and below decks, and From these 1,800 piculs, after 622 piculs have been deducted for the liberties of all the crew, there remain 1,178 piculs in each ship, of which one third of all the crew, there remain 1,178 piculs in each ship, of which one third o the lading is allotted to the owners, in consideration of the great expenses which they incur with the ships,

and the measurement duties which they have to pay, which amount to 392 piculs, thus leaving to divide among the moradores 784 piculs in each of the said ships, making a total of 1,578 piculs net, to divide among the said moradores in the manner stated in the lists compiled of the Bague. 45

Each year one or two ships would depart Macau according to the monsoon laden with cargoes of refined gold, ivory, iron, cloth and silk, the ships would load, besides sandal, wax, tortoiseshell, cinnamon, and slaves, at the ports of Citrena, Lifau, Dili, Hera, and Tolecao, on the north coast of Timor. Each ship would carry between 1,8002,000 sandalwood "peaks". Whenever possible the ships would call in at Batavia trading cloth against rice needed for the Lifau garrison. Occasionally the ship would call in at Malacca, Madura, Bali, Larantuca and other local ports. 46

From about 1695 the Senate in Macau organized a system of trade with Timor and Solor that would continue with minor modifications for nearly a century. As Boxer describes it, every year one, two, or three small ships left Macau annually for Timor, sometimes stopping in Batavia, sometimes direct. One third of the cargo space was reserved for the shipowner, the remaining two-thirds being distributed- albeit differentially-. A-among the citizens of Macau from captain-General, to widows and orphans. All shipowner in Macau were given a turn in this trade according to the system of pautas arranged between the Senate and Goa.47

Just as the Timor and Solor trade in sandalwood, gold, beeswax, and slaves, became the principal economic resource for Macau during the eighteenth century, so the organization of this trade fundamentally altered local social, and political organization in Timor. According to Souza, the Portuguese country traders from Macau successfully minimized the VOC and Chinese penetration of the Timor market throughout the 1670 and into the 1690s. Attempts by the Crown to impose its authority upon the local and mestico population did not seriously disturb the preferential supply of sandalwood to Portuguese country-trader shipping from Macau at that time. While Competition did arise from Chinese junks sailing from Batavia to Lifau, the Portuguese country traders were still able to corner superior grades of sandal as well as the largest quantitie bound for the Chinese market. Only the quantities of sandal reaching the market, according to a VOC report of 1690, were in decline by that year, however.48

Yet from the account of Alexander Hamilton published in 1727, the rebellion by Lifau (1688-1703) practically ruined the Macau trade, exhausting men, money and ships.49

There is truth in this account as, in 1705, owing to the inability of the city to pay the annual ground rent to the Chinese authorities, the Macau Senate offered the collateral for the Timor voyage deposited in the church of St.Pauls.50

While the Crown was satisfied to accept the submission in 1708 of Domingo da Costa, the most important rebel leader, winning by diplomacy what they could not achieve by arms, support from the country traders lessened to the degree that Governor Guerreiro failed to stop over-cutting of sandal and competition from owners of Chinese junks. By the 1710s, Souza writes, the Batavia market had assumed greater importance for Macau's country traders at Timor's expense. Despite appeals for aid from Macau in the 1720s in the face of another rebellion, the Macau Senate determined the Timor trade unprofitable given Crown administrative mismanagement including the imposition of customs duties. The result was that, upon the insistence of the Crown, Macau continued to send only one of its ships on an annual basis for the rest of the period. 51

Ljungstedt, writing from Macau in 1 836,lObserved that while profit from the sandalwood trade had greatly fallen off, the Macau Senate was nevertheless moved in 1720 to cut the poorer merchants out of the trade, a measure in any case overthrown by the court of Goa.52

In a possible retort to Goa, the Macau Senate in December 1723 complained to King Joao V over the imposition of new laws and an alteration in the price of sandal by the Governor of Timor (Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho) -doubtless at the behest of the Estado da India- pleading a fall in commerce at the expense of the people of Macau. In March 1726 the Crown upheld the petition from the Macau Senate ordering Goa to protect the sandal trade and to fall in line.53

In any case, with the edict of Chinese Emperor Yung-ching in 1723 lifting the prohibition on Chinese entering foreign trade and the participation by Chinese merchants in the triangular Timor-Batavia-Canton trade, the voyage from Macau to Timor became unprofitable. Ljungstedt remarks that a yearly vessel dispatched from Macau to Timor was reduced to conveying soldiers, officers, exiles, and ammunition, whil loading government paper, treasure etc. to be remitted by way of Macau to Goa. 54

From a Dutch perspective, the VOC sandalwood trade came to an end during the eighteenth century. In l752, following successive losses, the Company decided to waive its monopoly and allow anyone to cut sandalwood who was willing to pay one-third commission. In the event, the trade passed completely into the hands of the Chinese who remained in control for more than a century.55

The question remains, what then did the Dutch get out of it? According to a French report of 1782, not much! Every year one or two sloops would call in to Kupang from Batavia bringing varieties of cloth (coarse linen) and making the return journey with wax, tortoise shell, sandal, and "cadiang", a kind of bean used on board Dutch vessels to vary the diet. No particular gain and no particular loss were incurred by the Dutch establishment, or, in the words of the author, "la recette egale la depense" (the profits just answer the expenses). 56

Conclusion

While from about 1570 down, captains-major and, from 1696, governors for Solor and Timor, were regularly appointed, as we have seen, many were unable to exercise their authority, and others never reached the islands at all. We have also commented upon the conflict on Solor and, in turn, Timor, between the Dominicans and the state-appointed captains. While, as Boxer has pointed out, Goa sought to intervene in this question by offering up patents of Governorship to selected Portuguese residents in Larantuca for appointment to Lifau, the new centre of Portuguese power in the Flores-Solor zone, inevitably Goa was obliged to acknowledge the de facto leadership of one or other of the indigenized bosses on Timor. In any case, de Hornay was henceforth left alone until his death and, in Boxer's estimation, not such a bad ruler after all given the cireumstances. The real test for Goa, in any ease, was whether he could deliver up the

necessary contributions, which in fact he did. While on paper, as seen, it was the Viceroy in Goa that determined the distribution of voyages, in practice direct support from Goa was almost always more fictional than real. Boxer writes that only in two or three instances in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did Goa send government vessels direct to Timor. 57

But, to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, the Wallerstein-Hamashita-Lieberman Conundrum, as to whether Portugal accommodated or ruptured existing tributary and trade networks, at least in the period before the full onslaught of Western (British, Dutch and French) capital in Southeast Asia, and the development of a plantation economy on Timor, we can say that the Flores-Solor-Timor zone emerged as a discrete territorial and maritime entity under which Portugal and its local allies derived major profits from a reconstituted trade activity, albeit one in which they did not hold monopoly rights. Why? Because Asians - Chinese, Muslims and Timorese- never entirely relinquished the trade to the Portuguese, but adapted to the new circumstances. Sandal, which had over the centuries served as a milch cow for Timorese and foreign traders alike, eventually went into steady decline, not so much because of vulnerability to foreign competition or world market conditions, although as show below, that also occurred towards the end, but because of overcutting. Indeed, there is a sense that the sandal trade was counter-cyclical to the don trend in the classic spice trade beginning with the Dutch seizure of Banda in 1621. In fact, the sandal trade continued to surge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with demand outstripping supply. Sandal was simply the commodity which rescued the Macau treasury from utter Penury after the collapse o the Japan trade. However, and this is important, unlike the case of trade in spices in the Moluccas, Timor's sandal fluidly entered the circuits of Chinese trade on largely non-European terms, as mentioned, a commodity on which neither the Portuguese or Dutch ever gained a monopoly. While Reid -as with van Leur- acknowledges the existence of sandal as a trade item, Timor and the Solor zone is not included as one of his Southeast Asian "hubs of commerce", indeed simply not mentioned, possibly because it did not appear to support a large urban Centre and did not appear to spawn a merchant class, at least not at the source, although this view, too, might underestimate the merchant activities of the Dominicans and Larantuqueiros on Solor, Larantuca and Lifau. But also, as we have emphasized, the basic facts of the Timor trade in sandal contradicts the theory of irremediable decline, at least in the seventeenth century. 58

Eventually, as discussed below, it would be the strident independence of the Larantuqueiros which obliged the first-native born Portuguese governor to withdraw from Lifau to Dili in 1769, irrevocably moving the centre of gravity of Portuguese power on the island although not entirely displacing Chinese trading activities away from the Flores-Solor-Lifau networks. Rather than being a major arena of war between the Portuguese and Asian rivals, the Flores-Solor-Timor zone was one in which many participated at much profit. It is true the Lusitanian "peace" in the zone was assured by military supremacy and a system of fortified posts, but it is also true that the major Challenge to Portuguese command over the seas in this early expansion and "incorporation" stage was from their European as opposed to traditional religious or civilizational rivals.

Notes

1. See Andre Gunder Frank, "World System History", paper presented at annual meeting of the NewEngland Historical Association, Bentley College, Waltham, Mass., 23 April 1994; A.G. Frank and B.K.Gills, The World System: Five LIundred Years or Five Thousand?, Routledge, l993.

2. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System lfI: The Second Era of Great Expansion of theCapitalist World-Economy 1 730-1840s, Aeademie Press, San Diego, l989, p. 132.

3. Victor Lieberman, "Wallerstein's System and the International Context of Fjarly Moder11 SoutheastAsian History", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 24. No. 1, 1990.

4. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, Routledge &Kegan Paul, London, 1978.

5. Takeshi Hamashita, "The Tdbute trade System and Modem Asia", in A.J.H. Latham and Heita

Kawakatsu (eds.), Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy, Routledge, 1jOndon, 1994, pp. 9 I -107.

6. Manuel Teixeira, Macau e a sua Diocese: Missoes de Timor, Tipografia da Missao do Padroado, 1 962,pp.11-12.

7. L.C.D. de Freycinet, Voyage autour du monde, execut if sur leg corvettes S.M. l 'Uranie et la

Physicienne pendant leg annies 1817-1820, Paris, 1827.

8. Roderich Ptak, The Transportation of Sandalwood from Timor to Macau and China dudng the MingDynasty", Review of Culture, 1987, p. 34.

9. de Freycinet, Voyage, p. 529.

10. James J. Fox, "Colonial Kupang: Debauchery and Grace in the Dutch Port", in Kal Muller, East ofBali: from Lombok to Timor, Periplus F.ditions, Berkeley, 1991 , p. 246.

11. Appolonius Schot, "Relation du Voyage", in Recueil des Voyages qui ont servi a L 'itablissement etaux Progras de la Compagnie des lndes Orientalesformae dans leg Provinces- tfnies des Pays-Bas, TomeIV, Etienne Roger, Amsterdam, l705, pp. 207-214.

12. "F'undagao das primeiras christandades nas ilhas de Solor e Timor", mss in Biblioteca Nacionale, Lisboa, antigo Fundo Gera1, no.465, trancribed From Vol. IV of "Documentacao....Insulindia", cited in Joao Diogo Alarcao de Carvalho Branco, A Ordem de S. Domingos e as Origens de Timor, do Autor, Lisboa, l987, pp. 9-10, and see de Freycinet, Voyage.

13. de Freyeinet, Voyage, p. 539

14. Ibid., p. 532.

15. fI. G. Schulte-Northolt, The Political System of the Antoni, Martinus NLhoff, The Hague, 197l, p. 154, cited in Jill Jolliffe, East Timor, Nationalism and Colonialism, University of Queensland Press, St.Lucia, l978,p.26.

16. Abilio de Araujo, Timor Leste: Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar, Lisboa, 1977, pp. 82.

17. AHU Timor ex 1 doc no.3, 20 December 1643, Batavia.

18. Francisco Fer11andez, "Das Miss6es de Timor", Revista de Estudos, 1juSO-Asiaticos (Macau), No. 1 , Septembro 1992, p. 15.

19. Fr Mathias da MayasJ, Provincial of Japan to Fr.Goswin Nickel, General, Rome; annual letter, Macao, February 18, 1661, in Hubert Jacob SJ (ed.), The Jesuit Makassar Documents (1 615-1 682), Monumenta Historicasocietatas lesu, Vol. 134, Jesuit flistorical Institute, Rome, 1988, p. 52.

20. Fir. Antonio Franeisco SJ to Fr Giampaolao Oliva, General, Rome, Macao, 5 December 1670, in The Jesuit Makassar Documents, p. 234.

21. de Freycinet, Voyage, p. 532.

22. C.R. Boxer, "Portuguese Timor: A Rough Island history: 15 15-1960", 1Iistory lbday, May 1960, p.352.

23.Ibid.

24. William Dampier, A Continuation of a Voyage to New Holland etc. in the Year 1699, James and John Knapton, London, 1699 p. 185

25. de Freycinet, Voyage, p. 5, 45.

26. AfIU Caixa 1, doc 53, 1 December 1645, Pascoal Baneto to D. Joao. The full text of this letter has been published in Frazao de Vasconcelos, Timor: Subsidios Hist6ricos, Divisao de Publicac8es e Biblioteea, Agencia Geral das Colonias, 1Jisboa, 1937, pp. 19-21.

27. AHU Macau ms 89 Caixa 2 doc.14, "Senado da Camara de Ma}au to Governador de Manila", l2April l692.

28 J.J. Fox, The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Timor, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 64.

29. de Freyeinet, Voyage, p. 545.

30. William Dampier, A Continuation, pp. 176-178.

31. C.R. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East:1550-1770: Fact and Fancy in the History of Mac from artinus NLhoff, The Hague, 1948, p. 196.

32. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, p. 196.

33. Ibid. and see Boxer, "Portuguese Timor", p. 353.

34. "A Missao de Camboja" hart 1), Boletim do Governo do Estada da India, No.56, 1865, pp. 57j9. Yearly from 1605-55, the monsoon books or Crown letter orders or dispatches were sent from Lisbon to the Viceroy India.

35. Boxer, Fidalgos in the FarEast, p. l88.

36. Artur Teodoro de Mates, Na rota das Especiarias: De Malaca a Australia/On the Seaway to Spices: From Malacca to Australia, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, l995, pp. 120-121.

37. Villiers, EastofMalacca, pp. 72-73.

38. George Bryan Souza, Ike Survival of Empire: Portuguese I3Vade and Sociey in China and the South Chinasea, 1630-1754, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 109-111.

39. A. Teodoro de Matos, "Timor and the Portuguese trade in the Orient dudng the 1 8th Century", in A. T. de Matos e i,uis F'ilipe F. Reis Thomaz (eds.), As Relacoes eni7le a India Portuguesa, a Asia do Sueste e o ExtYlemO Oriente, Actas VI Seminado lnternacional de Hist6ria lndo-Portuguesa, Macau 22 a 26 0utubro de 199 1 , p. 437.

40. Roderich Ptak, u The Transportation oft Sandalwood", pp. 34-35.

41. Benjamin Videira Pires, A Embaixada Mirtir, Instituto Cultural de Macau, Imprensa Official, Macau, 1988.

42. de Matos, "Timor and the Portuguese Trade", p. 438. These documents comprised orders and

Dispatches received yearly at Goa from Lisbon in the monsoon of September-October with replies From 1 574-1614.

43. Ptak, "The Transportation of Sandalwood", p. 35.

44. SeeAjnquivos de Macau 3as6rie Vo1. IX, No.4.Abri1 1968.

45. C. R. Boxer, Portuguese SocieO; in the Topics: The MuniclPal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-1800, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison and Milwaukee, 1965, minutes of the municipal council meeting of the 20 October 1689, append. 10, p. 170.

46. de Matos, "Timor and the Portuguese Trade", p. 439.

47. Boxer, The MuniclPal Councils of Goa, pp. 57-58.

48. Souza, The Survival of Empire, p. l82.

49. Alexander Hamilton cited in C.R. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, pp. 186-7. Boxer believes the source of this account is Jht6nio Coelho Guerreiro, forlner Governor of Lifau.

50. Arquivos de Macau, 3o S6rie Vol. !X, No.4, April l968.

51. Souza, The Survival of Empire, p. l85.

52. Anders Ljungstedt, An Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlements in China and of the Roman Catholic Church and Mission in China and Description of the CiO, of Canton, James Munroe and Co., Boston, 1836, p. 9.

53. AHU Macau Cx3 No.14i December 26, 1723, uSenado da Camara de Macau to D. Joao V" and Dom Joao V to Vice-rei e capitao-general do Estado da India, Joao de Saldanha da Gama", 3 Marco 1726, Lisboa.

54. Ljungstedt, An Historical Sketch, p. 97.

55. F.J. Orlneling, The I'imor Problem, p. 102.

56. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, Histoire Philosophique et Politique Des Etablissemens et du Commerce des Europaens dans les Deux lndes, prome Premier, Jean-Leonard Pellet, Gen6ve, 1782, pp. 225-226. Jh English language version of Raynal's account appears in J. Justamond, A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies, John Exshaw and William Halhead, Dublin, MDCCLjXVI.

57. Boxer, Fidalgos in the FarEast, p. 196.

58. Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commenee 1450-1680.. Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993, p. 328.